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Abstract
Position scrambling (permutation) is widely used in multimedia encryption schemes and some international encryption
standards, such as DES and AES. This paper re-evaluates the security of a typical image scrambling encryption algorithm
(ISEA). Using the internal correlation remaining in the cipher-image, we can disclose some important visual information
of the corresponding plain-image under the scenario of a ciphertext-only attack. Furthermore, we have found the real
scrambling domain, position-scrambling scope of the scrambled elements of ISEA, which can be used to support an efficient
known/chosen-plaintext attack on it. Detailed experimental results have verified these points and demonstrated that some
advanced multimedia processing techniques can facilitate the cryptanalysis of multimedia encryption algorithms.
Keywords: Ciphertext-only attack, known-plaintext attack, cryptanalysis, image encryption, template matching.
1. Introduction
Position scrambling (permutation) is one of the simplest
and most efficient methods for protecting all kinds of
multimedia data [1, 2]. More importantly, it can effectively
facilitate an encryption scheme to obtain an efficient
combination of the properties of confusion and diffusion.
Over the past two decades, researchers have proposed
many multimedia scrambling algorithms, designing
different mechanisms to derive the position-scrambling
relation of the scrambling elements from a secret key.
Because the number of possible scrambling relations is the
factorial of the number of scrambling elements, there are
numerous different scrambling relations in theory when
the number of scrambling elements is sufficiently large. As
for image, video, and audio (speech), various forms of
datum can be selected as scrambling elements, including
the bit, pixel, and compressing coefficients of an image or
video [3, 4] or the transform coefficients and motion
vectors of video [5] or audio frames [6]. If the scrambling
elements are spatial blocks of an image, the recovery of
the original image can be classified as part of the general
problem of solving jigsaw puzzles discussed in [7].
In contrast to cryptography, which is designing an
algorithm to realize secure communication between the
sender and the intended recipient, the object of
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cryptanalysis is to gain as much information about the
secret key as possible without any prior knowledge of it
[8, 9, 10].
Some specific multimedia scrambling encryption
algorithms have been successfully cryptanalyzed under
different conditions, in terms of the number of required
plaintexts, the computational complexity of the attack, and
the storage space needed [11, 12, 13]. As different
scrambling elements may have dramatically different
effects on the sensible information of the plaintext,
different multimedia scrambling encryption algorithms
may possess totally different strengths against
ciphertext-only attack. However, their strengths against
plaintext attacks can be evaluated by a uniform model [3].
As cryptanalyzed in [3], any multimedia scrambling
encryption algorithm can be efficiently broken with
O(dlogL(MN)e) plaintexts and O(dlogL(MN)e · MN2)
computational time, where MN is the size of the
scrambling domain, the position-scrambling scope of the
scrambled elements, L is the number of different value
levels of the scrambled elements, and d·e returns the
smallest integer greater than or equal to a given number. In
[14], the computational load is further reduced to
O(dlogL(MN)e · MN) by replacing the operations of
intersecting sets of position candidates with linear visits of
a branch tree whose node stores information about the
position candidates.
In [15], a typical image scrambling encryption
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algorithm (ISEA) was proposed that scrambles a binary
presentation of a gray-scale plain-image with a
pseudo-random number sequence generated by iterating a
digital chaotic map. In 2011, ISEA was analyzed as a
scrambling encryption algorithm acting on a scrambling
domain of size M × (8N) [14]. In [15, Sec. 3.1], a weaker
version of ISEA was suggested to decrease the
computation complexity and save running time: every row
and column of the binary matrix of size M × (8N) are
scrambled with the same scrambling vector. In 2012, a set
of specific plaintexts were constructed by Zhao et al. to
recover the equivalent version of the secret key of ISEA
[16].
Here, we re-evaluate the security of the simpler version
of ISEA and find the real reasons behind its attack
advantage [16]: it does not act on a scrambling domain of
size M × (8N), but simply cascades two scrambling
algorithms with scrambling domains of sizes M and 8N.
We therefore propose an efficient known-plaintext attack
and a general chosen-plaintext attack on the algorithm. We
also found that important visual information of the plain
image can be observed from a single cipher image
encrypted by ISEA.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next
section briefly introduces ISEA. The security of ISEA
against ciphertext-only attack and plaintext attacks are
re-evaluated in Sec. 3 with some experimental results. The
last section concludes the paper.
2. Description of ISEA
The encryption object of ISEA is a gray-scale image of
size M × N (height×width), which can be represented as
a matrix over the set {0, 1, · · · , 255}: I = [I(i, j)]M−1,N−1i=0, j=0 .
The image I is further decomposed as an M × (8N) binary
matrix B = [B(i, l)]M−1,8N−1i=0,l=0 , where
7∑
k=0
B(i, l) · 2k = I(i, j), (1)
l = 8 · j + k. After preforming a scrambling of the row and
column vectors of B, the cipher-image I′ = [I′(i, j)]M−1,N−1i=0, j=0
is obtained, where I′(i, j) =
∑7
k=0 B
′(i, 8 · j + k) · 2k. The
basic concrete parts of ISEA can be described as follows.
• The secret key: three positive integers m, n, and Ti, and
the initial condition x0 ∈ (0, 1) and control parameter
µ ∈ (3.569945672, 4) of the Logistic map
f (x) = µ · x · (1 − x). (2)
• Initialization: 1) run the Logistic map from x0 to
generate a chaotic sequence, {xk}Lk=1, where
L = max {(m + M), (n + 8N)}; 2) produce a vector TM
of length M, where SM(TM(i)) is the (i + 1)-th largest
element of SM = {xm+k}Mk=1, i ∈ {0, 1, · · · ,M − 1}; 3)
produce a matrix TN of size 1 × (8N), where
SN(TN( j)) is the ( j + 1)-th largest element of
SN = {xn+k}8Nk=1, j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , 8 · N − 1}.
• The encryption procedure:
– Step 1 – vertical permutation: generate an
intermediate matrix B∗ = [B∗(i, l)]M−1,8N−1i=0,l=0 ,
where
B∗(i, :) = B(TM(i), :). (3)
– Step 2 – horizontal permutation: generate an
intermediate matrix B′ = [B′(i, l)]M−1,8N−1i=0,l=0 ,
where
B′(:, l) = B∗(:,TN(l)). (4)
– Step 3 – repetition: reset the value of x0 with the
current state of map (2), and repeat the above
operations from the initialization part (Ti − 1)
times.
• The decryption procedure is similar to the encryption
except for some simple modifications: 1) the multiple
rounds of encryption are executed in the reverse
order; 2) Step 2 is executed first in each round; 3) the
left parts and right parts of Eq. (3) and Eq. (4) are
swapped, respectively.
Note that the full version of ISEA is given in [14, Sec. 2],
where the matrix TN is of size M × (8N), each row vector
B∗(i, :) is scrambled by the i-th row vector of TN. As the
full version of ISEA was cryptanalyzed comprehensively
in [14], only the simpler version is studied in the remainder
of this paper.
3. Cryptanalysis of ISEA
3.1. Ciphertext-only Attack on ISEA
The ciphertext-only attack is an attack model for
cryptanalysis where the attacker can only access some
ciphertexts. Obviously, possessing sufficient robustness to
withstand the attack is a basic requirement for any
multimedia encryption algorithm. Unfortunately, ISEA
fails to satisfy the requirement.
The essential form of the encryption process of ISEA can
be represented by
B′ = (TL)Ti · B · (TR)Ti ,
2
where TL and TR are permutation matrices representing
the vertical permutation in Eq. (3) and the horizontal
permutation in Eq. (4), respectively [16]. As is well
known, the multiplication product of any number of
arbitrary permutation matrices is still a permutation
matrix, a square binary matrix possessing exactly one
entry of 1’s in each row and each column. Regardless of
the value of Ti and whether the intermediate matrices B∗
in Eq. (3) and B′ in Eq. (4) are updated in each round, the
final essential form of the encryption process of ISEA is
still
B′ = (TˆL)Ti · B · (TˆR)Ti , (5)
where TˆL and TˆR are permutation matrices. So, the
repetition of the operations in Step 3) have no influence on
obtaining the equivalent version of the secret key of ISEA.
Without loss of generality, we just set the number of
repetitions Ti = 1 in the following cryptanalysis.
Comparing Fig. 2a) and Fig. 2b), one can see that most
of the visual information contained in Fig. 2a) is concealed
by the scrambling operations. However, the correlations
existing between the rows and columns of image are not
changed. Given a row vector or a column vector of the
cipher-image, its neighbouring vector may be found by
searching for the vector possessing the highest correlation
index. Repeating this process iteratively in the horizontal
and vertical directions, an approximate version of B can be
obtained. Actually, the vector search problem can be
considered as one of the binary template matching
problems discussed in [17]. For simplicity, we selected the
ratio of the same bits existing in two binary vectors,
namely Sokal and Michncr’s measure discussed in [17], as
the similarity measure. For example, the image shown in
Fig. 2c) is the result obtained from that in Fig. 2b) by this
approach. Some visible image blocks can be automatically
detected with the image quality metric defined in [18],
where the image composed of the eight bit-planes of the
image in Fig. 1a) in the corresponding weight order is used
as the reference. Four cropped binary images are shown in
Fig. 3, which reveals some important visual information,
especially the rough sketch, of the original image shown in
Fig. 1a). As shown in Fig. 3d), the vector order of the
obtained result may be reversible to that of the right
version since only the relative locations among the vectors
can be confirmed.
3.2. Known-plaintext attack on ISEA
The known-plaintext attack is an attack model for
cryptanalysis where the attacker know every
implementation detail of the analyzed encryption
algorithm (Shannon’s axiom) and can access to a set of
plaintexts and the corresponding ciphertexts encrypted
a) b)
Figure 1: A pair of plain-image and the corresponding cipher-
image: a) image “Lenna”; b) cipher-image of a).
with the same unknown secret key. Because the two basic
scrambling parts of ISEA are exerted in two orthogonal
directions, its ability to withstand the known-plaintext
attack is weaker than other position permutation-only
encryption algorithm costing encryption complexity of the
same magnitude.
The equivalent version of the secret key of ISEA can be
recovered by the following traditional method: 1) For each
plain-bit, put the positions of the cipher-bits of the same
value into the set containing its permutation position
candidates; 2) If more than one sets of plain-images and
the corresponding cipher-image are available, intersect the
sets containing permutation-position candidates and obtain
a final set for each plain-bit; 3) Assign the estimated
permutation position of each plain-bit with the first
available (unassigned) element in its permutation position
set. Referring to [14], one can assure that O(dlog2(8MN)e)
known plain-images can support efficient break of ISEA
by considering it as a position-scrambling encryption
algorithm exerting on a scrambling domain of size M × 8N
with permuted elements of two possible values.
Essentially, ISEA is composed by cascading two basic
permutation-only schemes of following parameters:
scrambling domain of size M × 1 with permuted elements
of 2(8N) = 256N possible values; scrambling domain of
size 1 × (8N) with permuted elements of 2M possible
values. Due to the cascading, the two basic
permutation-only schemes can not be broken separately in
a direct way. However, some and even all parts of them
can be recovered iteratively. Concrete approaches are
described as follows.
• Step 1: Compare the number of elements 1’s in each
row vector of B′ with that in all row vectors of B. If
B( j∗, :) is the unique row of B possessing the same
number of elements 1’s as B′(i∗, :), one can assure
TM( j∗) = i∗ and put i∗ into set R.
• Step 2: Similar to Step 1, compare the number of
3
a)
b)
c)
Figure 2: Some intermediate images for breaking ISEA: a) binary presentation of the image in Fig. 1a); b) binary presentation of the image
in Fig. 1b); c) the recovered binary image from b).
a) b)
c) d)
Figure 3: Four visible segments cropped from the image shown in
Fig. 2c).
elements 1’s in each column vector of B′ with that in
all column vectors of B. If the former is unique in the
latter, the corresponding element in TN can be
recovered correctly and put the column number into
set C (the initial states of sets R and C are both
empty).
• Step 3: Compare each column vector of {B∗(i, :)}i∗ri=i∗1
with all column vectors of {B′(i, :)}i∗ri=i∗1 and add its
column number into set C if there exists the unique
same column vector, where {B∗(i, :)}i∗ri=i∗1 is recovered
via Eq. (3) and R = {i∗1, · · · , i∗r }.
• Step 4: Similar to Step 3, compare each row vector
of {B∗(:, j)} j∗cj= j∗1 with all row vectors of {B(:, j)}
j∗c
j= j∗1
and
add its row number into set R if there exists the unique
same row vector, where {B∗(:, j)} j∗cj= j∗1 is obtained via
Eq. (4), and C = { j∗1, · · · , j∗c}.
• Step 5: Iteratively repeat Step 3 and Step 4 till the
sizes of sets R and C are both not increased (only the
new-found number is added into R and C in the
above steps).
If more pairs of known plain-images and the
corresponding cipher-images encrypted with the same
secret key are available, the sets R and C can be further
expanded with the above steps. The values of TM(i∗∗) and
TN( j∗∗) can be assigned with the index of the first vector
possessing the same measure (the number of elements 1’s
in a vector or the vector itself) during the above
comparisons, where i∗∗ ∈ (ZM − R) and j∗∗ ∈ (Z8N − C).
As demonstrated in [3, 14], more known plain-images can
make the vectors possessing the same comparison measure
less, and TM(i∗∗) and TM( j∗∗) can be correctly guessed in
higher probability. In addition, they can be further checked
with the methods given in the previous subsection.
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To verify real performance of the attack given in this
subsection, we illustrate it with three pairs of known
plain-images of size 256 × 256, shown in Fig. 4, and the
corresponding cipher-images encrypted with secret key
m = 20, n = 51, x0 = 0.2009, and µ = 3.98. Using the
known plain-image shown in Fig. 4a), the sizes of R and C
can reach 118 and 18 after Step 2, respectively. Note that
the size of B is 256 × 2048. The size of R is further
increased to 192 and 256 after the 1-st and 2-rd operation
of Step 4, respectively. In contrast, the size of C is only
increased to 1809, 1913, 1921 after the 1-st, 2-rd and 3-th
operation of Step 3, respectively. As the 4-th operation of
Step 3 has no effect on increasing the size of C, we used
the second plain-image shown in Fig. 4b), which increases
it to 2002. Its maximal value was obtained with the third
plain-image shown in Fig. 4c). The ratios between sizes of
R, C and their respective maximal values during the above
attack processes are shown in Fig. 5, which confirms the
perfect performance of the proposed known-plaintext
attack.
a) b) c)
d) e) f)
Figure 4: Three pairs of plain-image and the corresponding
cipher-image: a) “Fighter Jet”; b) “Candy”; c) “Baboon”; d)
encrypted “Fighter Jet”; e) encrypted “Candy”; f) encrypted
“Baboon.”
3.3. Chosen-plaintext attack on ISEA
The chosen-plaintext attack is an enhanced version of
the known-plaintext attack, where an attacker can
arbitrarily choose the plaintexts to optimize the breaking
performance, e.g. reduce the number of needed plaintexts,
and/or increase the accuracy of the obtained information
of the secret key. In [16], a set of specific plain-images and
the corresponding cipher-images were selected to
accurately obtain the scrambling relation in the two
directions, respectively. However, we have found that the
method can be further optimized, as some chosen
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
k∗
0
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Figure 5: The ratios between the sizes of R, C and their maximal
possible sizes during the attack with three pairs of plain-images,
where k∗ denotes the index of the attacking steps.
plain-images can be used to break the scrambling
operations in the two orthogonal directions at the same
time.
If M ≤ 8N, the equivalent secret key of ISEA can be
recovered with the following steps:
• Step 1: Choose a plain-image satisfying B = [BL, BR],
where
BL = TL ·

1
1 1 0
...
...
. . .
1 · · · 1 1

M×M
· TR, (6)
TL and TR are any permutation matrices of size M ×
M, and BR is an M × (8N − M) matrix with constant
elements 0’s or 1’s.
• Step 2: As the number of 1’s in every row of B is
different and the horizontal permutation has no
influence on it, one can exactly recover the vertical
permutation vector TM by comparing the number of
1’s in each row of B and that of B′.
• Step 3: Now, ISEA has degenerated to a
permutation-only scheme operating in a scrambling
domain of size 8N with permuted elements of 2M
possible values. Referring to Eq. (5) in [1], one can
ensure that the 8N elements of vector TN can be
exactly recovered with dlog2M (8N)e chosen
plain-images, where
Bk(i, j) = b j/2M·k+ic mod 2,
bxc gives the largest integer less than or equal to x,
k ∈ {0, 1, · · · , dlog2M (8N)e − 1}, i ∈ {0, 1, · · · ,M − 1},
and j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , 8N − 1}.
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If 8N ∈ {M,M + 1}, the plain-image with B in (6) can
be used to accurately confirm M elements of TN with the
same approach as in Step 2. The sole remaining element
of TN can be recovered also when 8N = M + 1. So, the
number of required chosen plain-images for breaking ISEA
is dlog2M (8N)e = d 1M (3 + log2 N)e if M < 8N − 1; and
one if 8N ∈ {M,M + 1}. Similarly, one can deduce that
the required number is 1 + dlog28N (M)e = d 18N (log2 M)e if
M > 8N + 1; and one if M ∈ {8N, 8N + 1}. In all, one can
conclude that the number of required chosen plain-images
for breaking ISEA is
n∗ = 1 +

0 if 8N ∈ {M,M + 1,M − 1};
d 1M (3 + log2 N)e if 8N > M + 1;
d 18N (log2 M)e if M > 8N + 1,
which is much smaller than the estimated number
n′ =

d8N/Me + 1 if M < N;
9 if M = N;
≤ 9 if 8N ≥ M > N;
dM/8Ne + 1 if M > 8N,
given in [16, Sec. 5]. Concretely, one has n∗ = 2 if 8N +
1 < M ≤ 28N or M + 1 < 8N ≤ 2M . As for an image
of typical size 1704 × 2272, one can calculate n∗ = 1 +
d 11704 (3 + log2(2272))e = 2 and n′ = d8 · 2272/1704e + 1 =
11 + 1 = 12. As the computational load of the chosen-
plaintext attack on a position permutation-only encryption
algorithm is proportional to the product of the number of
required plaintexts by their sizes, the attacking complexity
of the proposed method is O(n∗ · MN) [3].
4. Conclusion
In this paper, the security of a typical binary image
scrambling encryption algorithm, called ISEA, against
ciphertext-only attack and known/chosen-plaintext attacks
was studied comprehensively. Just as previous
cryptanalytic works on the class of permutation-only
encryption algorithms have shown, secret scrambling
operations are incapable of providing a sufficiently high
level of security against known/chosen-plaintext attacks
alone. Besides this, this cryptanalysis demonstrates the
following added values on protecting multimedia data: 1)
The correlation existing in multimedia data may be used to
support some specific attacks and enhance breaking
performance; 2) The size of each independent scrambling
domain should be carefully checked to obtain the expected
security requirement; 3) No matter what the permuted
(scrambled) elements are, any permutation-only
encryption algorithms will not change their histogram. 4)
The security level of a multimedia encryption algorithm
should be suitable for a given application scenario.
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